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I. Introduction
In Brown v. Allen, 1 Justice Robert Jackson famously declared
of the Supreme Court “[w]e are not final because we are infallible,
but we are infallible only because we are final.” 2 The Supreme
Court exercised its power of finality in that case by limiting the
collateral review accorded to state court decisions by denying
post-conviction
relief
to
prisoners
challenging
the
constitutionality of their convictions. 3 Despite Justice Jackson’s
characterization of the Supreme Court’s finality, however, its
Brown decision was subsequently abrogated by amendments to
28 U.S.C. § 2254, as part of Congress’s revisions to the federal
courts’ ability to collaterally review both federal and state
convictions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 4 Balancing the interests of finality and
fallibility, however, remains the fundamental principle
underlying appellate review in the American legal system. 5
People of good faith want to get it right. They want justice.
From time to time, Americans have focused their attention on
1. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012), as
recognized in O’Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 1998).
2. Id. at 540 (Jackson, J., concurring).
3. See O’Brien, 145 F.3d at 20 (“Thus, even if lower federal court decisions
support the petitioner’s position or adumbrate the emergence of a rule favorable
to him, the writ cannot issue unless the state court decision contravenes, or
involves an unreasonable application of, extant Supreme Court jurisprudence.”).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402–
13 (2000) (acknowledging that the Brown decision was superseded by statute).
See generally Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (claiming a purpose of “deter[ing] terrorism,
provid[ing] justice for victims, [and] provid[ing] for an effective death penalty”).
5. See Joseph M. Giarratano, Essay, “To the Best of Our Knowledge, We
Have Never Been Wrong”: Fallibility vs. Finality in Capital Punishment, 100
YALE L.J. 1005, 1006 (1991) (discussing the fundamental balance between
wanted fairness and wanting a final decision).
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cases in which we fear our legal system has gotten it wrong.
Whether it is the case of Adnan Syed made famous in Sarah
Koenig’s Serial podcast, 6 or the case of Joseph Giarratano (which
anti-death penalty activists have raised as a rallying cry), 7 our
attention keeps being drawn towards the re-examination of
questionable cases. The proper balance between finality and
accuracy is not an easy one to achieve.
Absent divine intervention, human beings cannot achieve
metaphysical infallibility. Any serious attempt to even approach
infallibility in the results of our criminal justice system would
require an open-ended commitment to further review trial court
decisions as many times as necessary to eliminate any question
that could ever be raised, now and into the indefinite future.
There could never be a final decision. If it is anathema in any just
legal system to execute an even possibly innocent person, then
such an open-ended system may be necessary.
By contrast, any attempt to settle on a final, ultimate
resolution of a defendant’s guilt would necessitate cutting off all
further attempts to raise new facts or arguments questioning
that decision. One is hard-pressed to imagine any combination of
confessions, eye-witness identifications, and forensic evidence
that cannot be called into doubt. In fact, the cases where just
such evidence has been called into doubt are legion. 8 Any
declaration that we will review a defendant’s guilt no more
simply asserts that we have reviewed such questions enough.
This begs the question: Enough for what purpose?
The problem is that we do not all agree on what it means to
be “innocent” or “guilty.” Is guilt an objective truth or a
procedural conclusion? If it is an objective truth, no human-run
6. See Sarah Koenig, Serial, WBEZ CHICAGO (Fall 2014) (discussing the
evidence, whether admitted in trial or not, in the case of Adnan Syed’s
conviction for the murder of Hae Min Lee).
7. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Virginia Governor Blocks an Execution, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/20/us/virginia-governorblocks-an-execution.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS INVOLVING UNVALIDATED OR IMPROPER
FORENSIC SCIENCE THAT WERE LATER OVERTURNED THROUGH DNA TESTING,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/
02/DNA_Exonerations_Forensic_Science.pdf (collecting cases where a conviction
was based on wrongful forensic evidence).

1246

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243 (2016)

system can ever reach a final, definitive answer. If it is a
procedural conclusion, then metaphysical certainty is impossible.
One of the premises underlying the American legal system
of trials and appeals is that while we cannot achieve
metaphysical certainty of the accuracy of the results reached by
our courts, we can achieve a sufficient level of trust in the
results if we carefully guard the inputs and process by which we
reach those results. The function of the appeal is not to offer the
defendant a second chance to determine the question of his
guilt, but a chance to call the process by which his guilt was
determined into doubt. To achieve finality, the American legal
system attempts to enforce certain limits on perpetual appeals,
though it leaves open the possibility of an escape hatch to
prevent everyone’s worst nightmare—the execution of an
actually innocent person.
An interesting comparison to the American legal system’s
attempt to impose an imperfect finality is the Talmud’s criminal
justice system, which imposes no deadline on a condemned
defendant’s ability to raise new questions concerning his guilt. 9
One feature of the Talmud—Judaism’s compendium of religious
and civil law, rabbinic tradition, and philosophy—is its striving
to know the essence of a thing. 10 The Talmud’s “concern for
precise definitions” manifests itself in explorations of what
constitutes an object’s or an obligation’s “essence and which [of
its features] are dispensable.” 11 According to the Talmud,
earthly judges are not merely acting on their own behalf, but are
representatives of G-d, 12 and G-d’s presence is in their
9. See infra Section III.B (discussing the Talmud’s open-ended postconviction review process).
10. See Adam Kirsch, What Happens When the Talmud Asks, ‘What If?’,
TABLET
(Jan.
14,
2014),
http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-life-andreligion/159223/daf-yomi-66 (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (describing the function
of the remote speculations within the Talmud as provocation to consider
definitions and essences of things) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
11. Adam Kirsch, How the Talmud Maps Behavior by Exploring
Definitions, Not Listing Rules, TABLET (June 18, 2013) http://www.
tabletmag.com/jewish-life-and-religion/135210/daf-yomi-38 (last visited Sept. 21,
2016) [hereinafter Kirsch, How the Talmud Maps Behavior] (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. Beyond refraining from writing or uttering the formal or even informal
names of G-d, many Jews hyphenate the word itself. When writing for myself,
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judgment. 13 Thus, determining whether a condemned prisoner is
actually innocent or guilty is not a mere procedural question, but
a search for divine truth. Innocence and guilt are metaphysical
states of being. G-d commands: “An innocent person you shall not
slay.” 14 The Talmud, thus, bends over backwards to avoid
carrying out capital punishment, despite its exhaustive treatment
of the subject and deceptively draconian tone. 15 Finality of
judgment is sacrificed to ensure that no inaccurate judgment is
carried out.
These competing ideas between guilt and innocence as states
of being or conclusions derived from a valid, judicial process are
reflected in a debate that has engaged legal scholars—from the
Talmudic rabbis to the United States Supreme Court—for more
than a thousand years. 16 Importantly, recognizing the difference
between guilt and innocence as objective truths and guilt and
innocence as legal conclusions explains how Justice John Paul
Stevens and Justice Antonin Scalia managed to talk past each
other in In re Davis, 17 one of the Supreme Court’s treatments of
the subject of “actual innocence.” When Scalia’s critics attributed
to him the position that “executing even innocents doesn’t violate
the Constitution,” 18 they confused the two different views about
what it means to be “innocent.” This philosophical nuance is
meaningless to the horrifying prospect that a person may have
been wrongfully put to death by the American legal system. But
understanding the difference between these competing definitions
of “innocence” is essential to understanding Justice Scalia’s and
Justice Stevens’s disagreement in In re Davis.
and not directly quoting others whose practices may differ, I will keep to that
practice.
13. Haim Shapira, “For the Judgment is God’s”: Human Judgment and
Divine Justice in the Hebrew Bible and in Jewish Tradition, 27 J.L. & REL. 273,
294–300 (2011–12).
14. Exodus 23:7.
15. See infra Section III.B (discussing the Talmud’s criminal justice
system).
16. See infra Section IV (discussing the Talmud’s criminal justice debates).
17. 557 U.S. 952 (2009).
18. Dahlia Lithwick, How the Innocent End up on Death Row, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.tampabay.com/news/nation/how-the-innocentend-up-on-death-row/2196162 (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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This thousand-year-old argument continued to stymie the
Supreme Court through its 2015 term. 19 Justice Breyer argued
that the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutionally
cruel because of its “serious unreliability.” 20 He cited research
“estimat[ing] that about 4% of those sentenced to death are
actually innocent.” 21 Justice Scalia responded that the petitioners
before the Court were “afforded counsel and tried before a jury of
their peers” and thus “duly convicted and sentenced.” 22
The different ways in which the Talmud’s legal system and
the American legal system attempt to balance the competing
interests in accuracy and finality spotlight these different
conceptions of innocence and guilt. A system that prizes accuracy
above all, as the Talmud does in attempting to implement a
divinely-inspired system of ultimate justice, dispenses with
finality to ensure it never executes an innocent man. Yet a
system that attempts to maintain some element of finality in its
judgments, as the American legal system does, can still claim
never to have executed an innocent person—if you accept that
“guilt” is a legal determination, not an objective truth. The proper
balance between finality and accuracy plagued the rabbis of the
Talmud and continues to plague the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court.
As centuries of Talmud scholars have discovered, a good
Talmudic debate can be both a useful way to derive a difficult
answer and an enjoyable intellectual exercise for its own sake. 23
This Article will present one such Talmudic debate—on the
subject of finality in the criminal justice system’s attempt to
determine a condemned prisoner’s guilt or innocence—and show
that this same debate was carried out in almost identical terms
by the United States Supreme Court in In re Davis. Part II will
introduce readers to the Talmud, its structure, and its distinctive
19. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736–38 (2015) (debating the
merits of enforcing the death penalty).
20. Id. at 2756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 2758 (citation omitted).
22. Id. at 2746–47 (Scalia, J., concurring).
23. See David A Frank, Arguing with God, Talmudic Discourse, and the
Jewish Countermodel: Implications for the Study of Argumentation, 41
ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY 71, 80–83 (2004) (describing the historical role
of Talmudic debate in Jewish discourse).
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method of debate and analysis. Part III will compare the
American and Talmudic criminal justice systems, highlighting
the differences in available avenues for appellate review under
the Talmud and American law. Part IV will relate the debate in
the Talmud between Rav Acha bar Huna and Rav Sheishess over
what to do when a member of the court raises a new argument to
acquit a condemned prisoner, but is struck mute before being able
to state his argument, and will compare this debate with the one
between Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia over whether a
condemned prisoner who has exhausted his direct and collateral
appeals may raise a new claim of actual innocence. Part V will
further discuss the case of Troy Davis, the prisoner whose matter
was the subject of Justice Stevens’s and Justice Scalia’s debate.
Part VI will offer a conclusion about the meaning of guilt,
innocence, and finality in systems of divine and human justice.
Conceding my amateur status as a Talmud scholar, I make
no claims of understanding or conveying the entirety of the
Talmud’s treatment of the procedures and principles to be applied
in criminal trials or appeals. As discussed below, conveying the
entirety of the Talmud’s thought on any subject is a near
impossibility for even the most learned Talmud scholar. My
purpose in this essay is to highlight the similarity between one
particular Talmudic debate on the question of finality of criminal
judgments and an on-going debate amongst the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court on the same subject. Any debate
that continues in the same form for more than a thousand years
deserves our attention.
II. A Brief Introduction to the Talmud
Before I continue, a little explanation about the Talmud is in
order, as it has been remarked, “The Talmud is . . . a nightmare
for the uninitiated.”24 Worse, a little knowledge is a completely
24. See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning:
The Talmudic Rule Against Self Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955, 972–73
(1988) [hereinafter Rosenberg, In the Beginning] (“There is neither table of
contents nor index, and it is written in Hebrew and Aramaic freely intermixed.
It has no vowels and no punctuation. The language is, on its face, terse and
cryptic, presupposing broad and deep knowledge of the totality.”).
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baffling thing. Although the Talmud is divided into sixty sections,
called tractates, named for their purported areas of focus (e.g.,
“Tractate Sanhedrin” refers to the courts (sanhedrin)), the
discussions found within each tractate wander in an almost
stream of consciousness fashion to a seeming infinite series of
digressions—“[y]ou [will] seldom find subjects in the place where
you expect them.” 25 In the tractate ostensibly devoted to the rules
of regarding the observance of the Jewish High Holiday of Yom
Kippur, you will find significant information regarding which
types of structures require the posting of a mezuzah on the
door. 26 A tractate regarding the procedures for verifying the time
of the New Moon commencing the High Holiday of Rosh Hashana
provides the maxim that “a witness cannot act as a judge” and
then proceeds to discuss whether such rule only applies in capital
cases. 27 Because of this style of discussion and digression, “it is
impossible to find all conceptually related materials on any given
issue, unless, of course, one is already familiar with and
understands the entire Talmud.” 28 Another writer put it this way:
“[T]he Talmud itself is so unpredictably structured that it is
almost unusable as a practical legal guide. In order to know
where to look for a given subject, you’d have to know the entire
Talmud in advance.” 29
25. See Kirsch, How the Talmud Maps Behavior, supra note 11 (noting the
confusing structure of the Talmud and how within one chapter the focus can
shift to different subjects).
26. See Adam Kirsch, The Talmud Says God Can’t Protect Jews From
Persecution; They Must Take Precautions, TABLET (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-life-and-religion/154044/daf-yomi-60
(last
visited Sept. 21, 2016) [hereinafter Kirsch, The Talmud Says God Can’t Protect
Jews From Persecution] (“The connection with the ostensible subject of the
tractate, as often happens in the Talmud, is so fleeting that if you blinked you
might miss it.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
27. See Adam Kirsch, Talmudic Rabbis Debate the Practice of the Law
Versus the Intention Behind It, TABLET (June 10, 2014), http://www.tablet
mag.com/jewish-life-and-religion/175313/daf-yomi-85 (last visited Sept. 21,
2016) (explaining that a witness cannot also be a judge because then the judge
will not be able to exonerate the accused and follow the principal of innocent
until proven guilty that all judges are to follow) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
28. Rosenberg, In the Beginning, supra note 24, at 972.
29. Kirsch, The Talmud Says God Can’t Protect Jews From Persecution,
supra note 26.
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But the Talmud is more than a compilation of Jewish law. “If
the Bible is the cornerstone of Judaism, then the Talmud is the
central pillar, soaring up from the foundations and supporting
the entire spiritual and intellectual edifice.” 30 “Indeed, at least
from the perspective of traditional Judaism, to divine original
intent with respect to any law, one must view the Bible and the
Talmud as an indivisible partnership.” 31
According to Jewish tradition, G-d personally delivered to
Moses at Mount Sinai both the written Law set forth in the
Torah 32 and the oral Law that was then passed down from Moses
and on through his rabbinic successors in each generation. 33
Debates about the oral and written Law have occupied the Jewish
people from late Biblical times through the modern day. The
Talmud represents “the primary source” of Jewish law, though
far from the final and definitive source. 34
30. ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE ESSENTIAL TALMUD 3 (Chaya Galai trans., Basic
Books 2006).
31. Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy and the
Four Biblical Methods of Capital Punishment: Stoning, Burning, Beheading,
and Strangulation, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1169, 1175–76 (2004) [hereinafter
Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy] (explaining that in order to understand the biblical
death penalty, one must understand the Talmud).
32. The Torah contains the Five Books of Moses, traditionally given to the
Children of Israel by G-d at Sinai, during their exodus from Egypt. Collectively,
the Torah, the Writings, and the Prophets constitute the Jewish Bible, which is
known by the acronym formed by the Hebrew names for each section (Torah +
Nevi’im + Ketuvim = Tanach).
33. See Martin Pritikin, The Value of Talmud Study to Modern Legal
Education, 21 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 351, 352 (2007) (using cases from the
Talmud to explain its relevance to modern legal thought); Rosenberg, Of God’s
Mercy, supra note 31, at 1175 n.16 (“If we do not trust [the Sages’]
interpretation, we will be unable to fully understand the [commandments]. Just
as we received the Written Torah from our ancestors, so did we receive its oral
interpretation.” (quoting YEHUDA NACHSHONI, STUDIES IN THE WEEKLY
PARASHAH, SH’MOS 491 (Shmuel Himelstein trans., 1998) (citations omitted)));
see also Rosenberg, In the Beginning, supra note 24, at 967 n.47 (discussing
further the history of the oral and written Law in Jewish tradition and
scholarship).
34. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 4. Over the generations, Jewish scholars
have continued to comment on and add their own gloss to the never-ending
debate. Subsequent attempts to distill Jewish law and explain the Talmud
continued from the Twelfth Century Mishneh Torah of Moses Maimonides to the
legal opinions authored by leading rabbis to this day (responsa). See Pritikin,
supra note 33, at 355–57 (detailing the sources of Jewish law).
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The Talmud consists of two parts. The Mishnah, “a book of
halakha (law) written in Hebrew,” and the Gemara, “a summary
of discussion and elucidations of the Mishnah written in AramaicHebrew.” 35 The Mishnah was compiled between 30 B.C.E. and
200 C.E. and attempts to set forth the “terse, black-letter law”
derived from the “unbroken chain” of the oral Law transmitted
from the time of Moses. 36 The word “Mishnah” derives from the
verb root meaning “to repeat.” 37 The Gemara was compiled
between 200 C.E. and 500 C.E. and consists of rabbinic debates
about the meaning and sources of the law, with reference to
Biblical text, oral tradition, and Jewish folklore. 38 The word
“Gemara” means “learning” or “scholarship” in Aramaic and
“completion” in Hebrew. 39 “Whereas the Mishnah’s mission is to
lay out the law, the Gemara’s primary function is ‘to serve . . . as
a vehicle of theoretical explication [of the law].” 40 The title
“Rabbi” (or its variants “Rav” or “Rabban”), given to the scholars
quoted in the Talmud, derives from the word for teacher or
master. 41
The Talmud as it comes to us today is in large measure the
result of editing, compilation, and gloss added by the Eleventh
Century Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki (known by the acroynym
“Rashi”). 42 Rashi’s place as “the greatest commentator on the
Talmud” is “universally acknowledged,” and “[a]lmost all
Talmudic commentators after the time of Rashi relate to his
35. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 3.
36. Id. at 10, 57–62; see also Pritikin, supra note 33, at 353 (providing a
basic explanation of the Mishna); Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at
1175 (discussing biblical death penalties).
37. Rosenberg, In the Beginning, supra note 24, at 968 n.48.
38. See STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 10; Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra
note 31, at 1175 (“The Mishnah, which generally states terse, black-letter law,
was redacted circa 200 C.E.; the far lengthier Gemara, which is an
extraordinary commentary consisting largely of rabbinic debates invoking
biblical, mishnaic, and midrashic sources, was redacted some three centuries
later.”).
39. Rosenberg, In the Beginning, supra note 24, at 969 n.49.
40. Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1188 (quoting ADIN
STEINSALTZ, THE STRIFE OF THE SPIRIT 80 (1988)).
41. PETER SCHAFER, THE HISTORY OF THE JEWS IN THE GRECO-ROMAN WORLD
133 (2003).
42. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 116.
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commentary, in some way disagreeing with it, defending it,
interpreting it, or clarifying it.” 43 Because of the respect given to
his views, Rashi’s commentaries are included alongside the
Talmud’s text, set apart in special “Rashi script.” 44
A passage in the Talmud will begin with a statement of the
law from the Mishnah, followed by a rabbinic debate in the
Gemara posing questions about the Mishnah’s assertion, typically
questioning the source for the Mishnah’s conclusion, challenging
its reasoning, or seeking to clarify its meaning through the use of
hypothetical scenarios. 45 As readers will discover when this
Article explores one such rabbinic debate concerning finality in
criminal jurisprudence, that these hypotheticals may stray from
the legal point under consideration or propose absurd situations
does not undercut the Talmud’s elucidation of the law, but rather
serves to support the entire structure. “The Gemara may, after a
detour, return to the prior topic, or it may finish a topic with
certain questions left unresolved. But no matter what twists and
turns the Gemara takes, the job of the student is to look for
logical consistency throughout.” 46 As should be familiar to any
American law student practiced in the art of Socratic instruction,
“[a]s new sources or arguments are introduced, the [Talmud
reader] may be forced to revisit and revise initial assumptions
about the scenario, the rule, or the underlying principles that
connect them.” 47
For example, if in the Torah G-d commands the Jewish
people that on the Sabbath they are to “perform no labor,” 48 the
Talmud attempts to answer the question of what constitutes
performing labor. Such a question may appear simple. One oral
tradition relies on the idea that G-d’s command to observe the
Sabbath as a day of rest commemorated G-d’s cessation of labor
43. Id. at 119.
44. Id. at 116–19.
45. See Pritikin, supra note 33, at 358 (comparing Mishna argument to
Gemara argument).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 351, 361 (“Often, a mishna will employ only a few words to
represent a complicated factual scenario. Part of the job of the student is to try
to determine what that scenario is. Logic, creativity, and linguistic analysis are
all crucial ingredients to success in this endeavor.”).
48. Exodus 20:8–11.
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at the completion of creating the universe, and thus “labor”
should constitute creative actions. 49 This generalized approach
does not suffice, however, because “no single definition could
cover all the complex problems likely to develop.” 50 The Mishnah
can compile a list of forbidden actions (based upon the thirty-nine
separate, basic labors said to be necessary for the construction of
the Tabernacle in the wilderness—something the Torah
specifically forbids the Jewish people from doing on the Sabbath)
but the commentary in the Gemara is necessary to derive from
this list the types of labors “similar in essence, although differing
in detail,” which are then likewise forbidden. 51 If “carrying” is
forbidden, is “transporting saliva in one’s mouth” considered
“carrying”? 52 To love such a question is to love the Talmud.
While the Talmud contains a myriad of important rules and
regulations governing every aspect of an observant Jew’s life, it
also displays an abiding “interest in theoretical argument, even
when no practical issue is at stake.” 53
Voicing doubts is not only legitimate in the Talmud, it is
essential to study. To a certain degree, the rule is that any
type of query is permissible and even desirable; the more the
merrier. No inquiry is regarded as unfair or incorrect as long
as it pertains to the issue and can cast light on some aspect of
it. 54

49. See STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 148 (“Just as God ceased from His
labor—creation of the world—on the Sabbath, so the children of Israel are called
upon to refrain from creative work on this day.”).
50. Id. at 148–49.
51. See id. at 149 (discussing the complex subcategories derived from the
thirty-nine basic labors). For a more thorough example of the Talmud’s
analytical approach, see Pritikin, supra note 33, at 365–85. The fact that
Pritikin titles step six of his eight-step illustration of the Talmud’s reasoning
process “A Proposed Solution to the Flaw in the Alternative Resolution” should
tell readers something about the complexity of Talmudic analysis. This should
not daunt American lawyers who are woefully familiar with pleadings such as
Sur-Replies to the Second Cross-Motion for Reconsideration of the District
Court’s Order Denying Rehearing.
52. Kirsch, What Happens When the Talmud Asks, ‘What If?’, supra note
10.
53. Kirsch, The Talmud Says God Can’t Protect Jews From Persecution,
supra note 26.
54. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 8.
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“[I]t is the debates themselves, rather than the rules
propounded, that are the glory of the Talmud.” 55 Even G-d is said
to enjoy a good Talmudic debate and does not mind losing. 56
In fact, the Talmud’s entire treatment of the procedures and
safeguards required before condemning a criminal to death,
reviewing his sentence, and carrying out the punishment
constitutes a giant advisory opinion. The Talmud recognizes that
capital cases can only properly be tried while there is a Great
Sanhedrin sitting in the Temple in Jerusalem that was destroyed
by the Romans in 70 C.E. 57 The Talmud’s compilers did not let
the hypothetical nature of many of their questions stop them
from addressing them in great detail. Deriving the correct answer
was its own reward and half the fun. 58 All of us who have been
first-year law students should appreciate that.
55. Rosenberg, In the Beginning, supra note 24, at 969–70.
56. In Bava Metzia 59b, the Talmud relates a much-loved story about
Rabbi Eliezer’s lone defense of his position regarding the ritual purity of an oven
(“The Oven of Akhnai”) against an unnamed majority of opposing rabbis. Rabbi
Eliezer appeals for signs from G-d to show support for his position, which G-d
provides by way of several miracles—a carob tree is uprooted, the waters of a
canal run backwards, the walls of the hall lean. Id. Finally, a voice from Heaven
itself proclaims support for Rabbi Eliezer. Id. The other rabbis, astoundingly,
reject this Heavenly support for Rabbi Eliezer, citing Deuteronomy 30:12 for the
proposition that the Law “is not in Heaven”—meaning that G-d already set forth
the Law and presented it to Moses and his rabbinic successors, to whom G-d
gave authority to decide such matters by majority. Id. The Talmud’s coda to this
story relates Rabbi Nassan’s occasion to meet the prophet Elijah who tells Rabbi
Nassan that G-d’s reaction to the rabbis’ refutation of his support for Rabbi
Eliezer was one of joy: G-d “was laughing and saying my children have prevailed
over Me, My children have prevailed over Me.” Id. Generations of Talmud
scholars have taken heart from this story as encouragement to leave no
argument unchallenged. See Stephen J. Werber, The Essence of Talmudic Law
and Thought by Samuel N. Hoenig, 17 J.L & REL. 297, 300 (2002) (“It is man,
and man’s intelligence and free will, that rules.”); Daniel J.H. Greenwood,
Akhnai, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 309, 342–44 (1997) (explaining how the Talmud
story of Eliezer defeating G-d in argument shows that to be called
argumentative in the Talmud is to be praised).
57. Sanhedrin 52b. See also Shabbos 15a (acknowledging the Great
Sanhedrin’s abstention from hearing capital cases in exile); Rosenberg, Of God’s
Mercy, supra note 31, at 1176 n.21 (describing the destruction of the Temple and
the various theories on when the Temple ceased to hold hearings).
58. Kirsch, The Talmud Says God Can’t Protect Jews From Persecution,
supra note 26, describes the Talmud’s attention to the question of how a Temple
High Priest would arrange to have a second wife ready, just in case his original
wife died immediately before the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. Because certain
rituals must be performed by the High Priest—and only the High Priest—in
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Literary critic Adam Kirsch, writing about his experience
engaging in the tradition of Daf Yomi (reading and studying a
page of the Talmud a day), observes that the Talmud’s attention
to hypothetical questions is not merely “academic speculation[]”:
I’ve found it useful, in the course of reading Daf Yomi, to think
of these kinds of questions as the rabbis’ indirect way of asking
about definitions and essences. In laying down the Shabbat
laws, for instance, one rabbi asks whether transporting saliva
in one’s mouth is considered “carrying,” in which case one
would have to spit it out every few paces. The point of the
question, it seems to me, is not whether a Jew should go
around spitting all the time, but exactly how to define a
substance: Is matter within the body a separate entity, or part
of the body itself? This kind of speculation about substances
and their qualities was central to classical and medieval
thought, including Jewish thought. Because Jewish law deals
with everyday matters, it produces a kind of everyday
metaphysics. 59

order for the Jewish people to make proper atonement to G-d for their sins on
this most holy day, the Talmud describes various preparations to be undertaken
to ensure the High Priest’s presence and spiritual purity when he is needed on
Yom Kippur. Id. Elsewhere in the Talmud, the rabbis determined that the High
Priest must be a married man. Id. Kirsch notes that the Talmud’s tractate
setting forth the rules for observing Yom Kippur require that “an alternate High
Priest [be] appointed for Yom Kippur, in case the regular one was disqualified
by ritual impurity.” Id. (discussing Yoma 13a). Rabbi Yahuda suggested, if an
alternate High Priest was required, should not the High Priest likewise have an
alternate wife standing by, to ensure that he satisfied the requirement that he
be a married man? Id. The Talmud rejected this arrangement as an unnecessary
precaution. Id. Kirsch observes: “[T]his doesn’t stop the Gemara from picking
up Yehuda’s suggestion and examining its legal implications. The High Priest
doesn’t need an alternate wife, the rabbis say—but what if he did?” Id. The
Talmud then proceeds to discuss how such a hypothetical, not-required
precaution would be arranged.
The Talmud itself illustrates the risk involved in dismissing seemingly absurd
hypotheticals. In a discussion regarding the proper method for putting on tefilin
(prayer boxes strapped to one’s head and arms), one rabbi scoffed at a question
asking how a man with two heads should wear tefilin—in so many words telling
the questioner to get out of here with such a stupid question. At just that
moment, a man arrives to ask the rabbi whether he is required to make one
donation or two for his son who was just born with two heads. See Rosenberg, In
the Beginning, supra note 24, at 970 n.52 (discussing Menachos 37a); Menachos
37a (discussing the obligation to make a donation of five silver shekels to
“redeem the firstborn” from the otherwise applicable obligation of the firstborn
to serve the Tribe of Levi).
59. Kirsch, What Happens When the Talmud Asks, ‘What If?’, supra note
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Many such questions addressed by the Talmud have important
implications to the daily lives of traditionally observant Jews. An
observant Jew must know what he or she is permitted to carry on
the Sabbath, while obeying the commandment to “perform no
labor.” But the Talmud also trains the student to explore the
essence of questions for its own intellectual exercise.
In his attempt to introduce the Talmud to readers, like your
humble author, who lacked a yeshiva education and years of
Talmud learning, Adin Steinsaltz conceded that “[a]ny
description of its subject matter or study methods must,
inevitably be superficial because of the Talmud’s unique
nature.” 60 Steinsaltz advised that “[t]rue knowledge can only be
attained through spiritual communion, and the student must
participate intellectually and emotionally in the talmudic debate,
himself becoming, to a certain degree, a creator.” 61 Let us then,
together, continue the tradition of Talmud learning, and explore
what it has to teach us about how the American legal system
handles the question of finality in the criminal justice system. 62
A. The Use of Talmud in American Law
In fact, the Talmud is no stranger in this strange land.
Justice William Douglas noted the differences between American
constitutional law’s distinction between coerced and voluntary
confessions and the Talmud’s exclusion from court of all
self-incriminatory statements (whether coerced or voluntary) in
Garrity v. New Jersey. 63 In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 64
10.

60. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 9.
61. Id.
62. For additional history and understanding of the Talmud’s place in
Jewish law and thought, see Michael J. Broyde, The Foundations of Law: A
Jewish Law View of World Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 79, 80 n.3 (2005) and Suzanne
Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model
in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 816 n.13
(1993).
63. 385 U.S. 493, 497 n.5 (1967). See also Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d
978, 990 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[A]s part of the ancient Jewish law, there is found in
the Talmud the Hebrew equivalent of the Latin maxim nemo tenetur seipsum
prodere, ‘no one is bound to betray himself.’” (citations omitted)).
64. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
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Justice Scalia noted the Talmud’s remark, with respect to the
Scripture—“Turn it over, and turn it over, for all is therein”—
before chiding the Supreme Court majority, saying, “Divinely
inspired text may contain the answers to all earthly questions,
but the Due Process Clause most assuredly does not.” 65
At times, American courts have praised as “Talmudic”
analyses that display “breadth and thoroughness” 66 or
painstaking attempts to find “compatibility [in] seemingly
inconsistent provisions.” 67 Other American courts have dismissed
as “Talmudic” the “dissection” of word choices that deprive court
opinions of context, 68 or the “parsing of a single sentence or two,
as if we were occupied with a philosophical enterprise or
linguistic analysis.” 69
The Talmud has much to teach American lawyers, jurists,
and scholars. One need not propose the adoption of the Talmud’s
conclusions to questions of modern American law to appreciate its
methodology and the pleasure of Talmudic reasoning, in the most
positive sense of the phrase. 70

65. Id. at 903 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Faus Group, Inc. v. United States, 581 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
67. Morgan Stanley High Yield Sec., Inc. v. Seven Circle Gaming Corp., 269
F. Supp. 2d 206, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
68. United States v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2007).
69. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
70. See Samuel J. Levine, Essay, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and
Its Application to the American Legal System: A Conceptual Overview, 29 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 1037, 1037–38 (1998) (“In recent years, a growing body of
scholarship has developed in the United States that applies concepts in Jewish
law to unsettled, controversial, and challenging areas of American legal
thought. While some scholars endorse the application of Jewish legal theory to
American law, others are more cautious.” (footnotes omitted)); Irene Merker
Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Advice from Hillel and Shammai on How to
Read Cases: Of Specificity, Retroactivity and New Rules, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 581,
582 (1994) (“One of the pleasures of studying Talmud . . . is encountering
arguments between the Sages that took place 1,500–2,000 years ago concerning
sophisticated issues that are . . . analogous to . . . American law. We are not
surprised when the Talmud’s resolution of a problem is superior to the modern
answers.”).
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B. A Note on Talmud Citations
Two versions of the Talmud exist—one compiled by the
smaller Jewish community that remained in Jerusalem after the
Roman exile of the Jews in 70 C.E. and one compiled by the then
more prominent center of Jewish scholarship in Babylonia. 71
Because the Babylonian Talmud was completed at a later date, is
more extensive in coverage, and is considered to have undergone
more thorough editorial review, it is generally considered more
authoritative than the Jerusalem Talmud. 72 This Article uses the
Talmud Bavli (Babylonian Talmud) as its source material.
Working with the Talmud in translation, as I do, loses much
of its flavor and diversity of opinion. A great deal of the Talmud’s
value lies in the interspersed commentary on commentary, some
of the most important being the glosses added by later scholars,
such as Rashi, added to the margins of the original material.
Published translations lose much of this material. For my
lay-scholar purposes, I have worked with the ArtScroll Series
Schottenstein Travel Edition of the Talmud Bavli. 73 Though I am
citing to an English language translation, I will adhere to
traditional Talmud citation forms and reference quoted passages
by tractate and folio (folios being further divided into two parts—
a and b—representing the Hebrew letters aleph and bet). 74 Thus,
I will cite the key passage discussed below as “Sanhedrin 43a”
and will not refer to the page number of my particular volume in
translation. In fact, the Schottenstein Edition, following
tradition, contains no page numbers for its translation. 75 Some
folios are given additional superscript notations, e.g., “Sanhedrin
34a1.” I will cite references to the modern footnoted explanations
71. See Pritikin, supra note 33, at 353–54 (providing more detail on the
origins of both versions of the Talmud).
72. See id. (explaining differences between the two versions of the Talmud).

73. Schottenstein Travel Edition of the Talmud Bavli (Rabbi Tisroel Simcha
Schorr & Rabbi Chaim Malinowitz eds., 2009) [hereinafter the Schottenstein
Edition].
74. See Rosenberg, In the Beginning, supra note 24, at 969 n.49 (explaining
naming conventions of the Talmud).
75. See id. (“Although modern editions include page numbers in Arabic
numerals, it is considered a sign of ignorance and bad form to use them in
Talmudic discourse.”).
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added by the editors of my edition, for example, as “Sanhedrin
43a Schottenstein Edition n.24.”
III. Comparing Criminal Justice Under American and Jewish
Law
This Part will summarize and compare the basic substantive
and procedural facets of the American and Talmudic criminal
justice systems, with particular attention to the procedural
requirements for appellate review of guilty verdicts. This Article
will not engage in a thorough analysis of the substantive hurdles
claimants must overcome. This Article will present procedural
limitations and substantive standards in summary fashion
merely to give readers an idea of how the respective criminal
justice systems function and compare. For example, while the
Talmud permits a convicted defendant to present any new
argument so long as there is “substance” to it, 76 American law
restricts petitioners attempting to raise new claims they failed to
raise in previous rounds of review to claims that could not have
been discovered previously or which have only become available
through a recent change in applicable law. 77 What sorts of
arguments will satisfy the Talmud’s or AEDPA’s requirements
can be addressed in greater detail elsewhere. It is my intention
here merely to demonstrate that the American legal system
imposes greater limitations on the number and kinds of new
arguments a condemned prisoner may raise to reargue the
question of his guilt than the Talmud’s legal system does. Once
we have confronted the difference in how the American legal
system and Talmudic legal system treat the interest in finality,
we can then explore the implications of this difference as brought
out in the debates among the Talmud’s rabbis and American
jurists when a difficult case strains the court’s willingness to
accept a final decision.

76. See Sanhedrin 42b–43a (laying out the Talmud conditions for a
convicted person to bring up a new argument on appeal).
77. See infra Parts II–III (discussing the United States’ conception of a fair
trial and appeal).
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A. American Law’s Limitations on Post-Conviction Review
Anyone who tells you that some large number of judges has
reviewed a criminal conviction and assured themselves that the
convicted defendant was guilty is someone who does not
understand how the American criminal justice system works.
1. A Fair Trial
Accused defendants are entitled to a familiar panoply of
constitutional safeguards to ensure that their trials are fair—the
right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, the introduction of only evidence that was collected
according to constitutional requirements, the prosecution’s
burden to prove the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, et
cetera. 78 But after such a trial is held, the defendant’s guilt is
something that the jury decides, not the judge (unless the
defendant has waived that right and consented to a bench trial). 79
Even the trial judge, in the first instance, can only throw out the
jury’s verdict and enter a judgment of acquittal if she determines
that “a reasonable jury could not [have found] guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 80 It is not within the trial judge’s prerogative
to simply “reweigh the evidence or second-guess the jury’s
credibility determinations.” 81 Short of ruling that no reasonable
jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the best
the trial judge can do is order a new trial “if [she] believes that
there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has
occurred—that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.” 82
As the phrase suggests, when a defendant successfully moves for
a new trial order based on such a ruling, he still faces possible
conviction at the conclusion of that new trial. 83
78. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, and VI.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
80. United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2013).
81. See United States v. Gonzalez, 737 F.3d 1163, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013)
(noting that the decision a jury gives should be given great deference by the
judge).
82. United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1004–05 (3d Cir. 2008).
83. See United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 657 F.3d 896, 901 (9th Cir. 2011)
(detailing when a motion for a new trial can be made).
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2. A Direct Appeal

A convicted defendant may file a direct appeal challenging
the legal sufficiency of the evidence against him to support the
verdict (reviewed de novo by the appellate court, albeit with all
inferences arising from the evidence made in the light most
supportive of the guilty verdict). 84 “A jury’s verdict cannot be
overturned if any reasonable construction of the evidence would
have allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 85 Jurors, after all, had the opportunity to hear
the evidence first-hand and look the witnesses in the eye when
weighing their credibility, while all appellate courts have to go on
are the cold transcripts of the trial proceedings. 86
A convicted defendant may also seek a new trial on the basis
of any evidentiary 87 or procedural errors 88 he asserts the trial
judge may have made (reviewed only for an abuse of the trial
judge’s discretion over such matters). The appellate court reviews
the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and reviews legal
errors (such as misapplication of the law or infringement of
constitutional rights) de novo. 89 That is, while an appellate court
is free to decide for itself whether the trial court properly
interpreted and applied the law, 90 an appellate court reviews the
84. United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2011).
85. Id. (citation omitted).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 79 F.3d 1489, 1497 (7th Cir. 1996) (“As
an appellate court, we will not second-guess the jury on [the credibility
determination], which was best resolved through giving the . . . jury the
opportunity to observe the verbal and non-verbal behavior of the
witnesses . . . rather than looking at the cold pages [of a transcript].” (quoting
United States v. Lakich, 23 F.3d 1203, 1210–11 (7th Cir. 1994))).
87. See United States v. Hale, 685 F.3d 522, 538 (5th Cir. 2012) (examining
what sort of evidentiary errors would lead to abuse of discretion).
88. See United States v. Jirak, 728 F.3d 806, 815 (8th Cir. 2013) (“We
review a district court’s denial of a request for continuance for an abuse of
discretion and will only reverse if the moving party was prejudiced by the
denial.”).
89. See United States v. Howard, 621 F.3d 433, 450 (6th Cir. 2010)
(explaining the applicable standards of review); United States v. Lazarenko, 564
F.3d 1026, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009) (same).
90. See United States v. Williams, 340 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“[D]e novo review requires us to look at a question as if we are the first court to
consider it. Put simply, it is definitionally impossible to give deference of any
sort to a decision being reviewed de novo.”).
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trial court’s factual findings with greater deference and will only
reverse the trial court’s decision if, after reviewing all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the decision, it is left with
“a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” 91
An appellate court reviews a defendant’s sentence for both
procedural error and substantive reasonableness under a
deferential abuse of discretion standard. 92
Still, a criminal defendant is entitled only to a “fair trial,” not
a perfect one, “for there are no perfect trials.” 93 Under the
Harmless Error doctrine, “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or
variance that does not affect [a defendant’s] substantial rights
must be disregarded.” 94 The requirement that an error affect a
defendant’s substantial rights in order to be considered reversible
error essentially means that it “must have affected the outcome”
of the trial. 95 The Harmless Error doctrine—requiring the
prosecution to establish that a challenged error did not affect the
outcome of the trial in order to preserve the judgment—applies
only to claims of error that the defendant preserved at trial by
raising a contemporaneous objection to the challenged conduct. 96
If the defendant failed to raise a contemporaneous objection at
trial, the burden switches to him and he would be required to
establish on appeal that any claimed error constituted “plain
error”—i.e., error that was plainly established by the time of the
appeal, affected the outcome of the trial, and seriously affected
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. 97 Only certain structural errors—such as the total
91. United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 728 n.3 (1st Cir. 2011).
92. See United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1275 (11th Cir. 2013)
(citations omitted) (describing the different levels of analysis used under an
abuse of discretion standard).
93. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1973).
94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
95. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).
96. See United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1293 (1st Cir. 1997)
(“[A]bsent a timely objection at trial, our review is solely for plain error under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).” (quoting United States v. Reed, 977
F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1992))).
97. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 734–35 (“It is the defendant rather than the
Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In
most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the
defendant shows that the error was prejudicial.”).
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deprivation of the right to counsel or the right to an impartial
judge—are said to so fundamentally “affect[] the framework
within which the trial proceeds” that they are exempt from
harmless or plain error analysis and trigger an automatic
reversal of a judgment and the defendant’s right to a new trial. 98
Such structural defects so pervasively affect the proceedings that
the “trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for
determination of guilt or innocence.” 99 The process the defendant
received in such cases cannot properly be called a “trial” at all.
Absent such a structural error, however, the defendant’s appeal
depends on establishing that any errors committed at his trial
sufficiently affected the outcome to be considered reversible
errors.
For a defendant tried in federal court, his direct appeal is to
the United States Court of Appeals, and if the appellate court
rules against him, he may seek review by the United States
Supreme Court. 100 In the case of a defendant tried and convicted
in state court, he may seek Supreme Court review from the final
decision of whichever state appellate court constituted the court
of last resort in his circumstances. 101 In either case, the United
States Supreme Court has discretion whether to accept review of
the lower court’s ruling, and typically accepts review of a very
small percentage of the cases seeking its attention. 102 In an
average year, the Supreme Court receives approximately 7,000–
8,000 petitions to review lower court decisions and hears
argument in only about eighty cases. 103 In its 2012–2013 term,
98. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991).
99. Id.
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012) (describing methods of Supreme Court
review of circuit court decisions).
101. The United States Supreme Court has discretionary authority to review
“judgments of a ‘state court of last resort’ or of a lower state court if the ‘state
court of last resort’ has denied discretionary review.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.
Ct. 641, 656 (2012) (quoting SUP. CT. R. 13.1). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012)
(granting the Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction to review “[f]inal judgments
or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had”).
102. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for writ of certiorari will be granted
only for compelling reasons.”).
103. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (on
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only twenty-one out of seventy-eight cases decided on the merits
were criminal matters. 104 In the unlikely event that the Supreme
Court hears the case, it will review whether the lower courts
applied the correct legal standards, not the substantive merits of
the jury’s verdict. 105
That is the defendant’s one direct appeal. After the court of
last resort, whether it is the state or federal intermediate
appellate court or the Supreme Court, has denied the defendant
relief from his conviction or sentence, the judgment is considered
final. 106
There are various reasons for the procedural and substantive
limitations on direct appeals and deferential review afforded trial
court decisions, but the point is that the appellate system is
designed to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial because a
trial is where the question of a defendant’s guilt is determined.
The appellate system is not intended to answer that question, but
to make sure that that question is answered in a trustworthy
manner. If we satisfy ourselves that the inputs used to decide the
question of the defendant’s guilt merited our trust, then we can
accept the verdict produced by the trial.
3. Collateral Review
To help safeguard the output produced by the trial and direct
appeal processes, additional but circumscribed opportunities to
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
104. Kedar S. Bhatia, Final October Term 2012 Stat Pack, SCOTUSBLOG at
6 (June 27, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/final-october-term-2012stat-pack/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
105. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction and the Supreme Court’s
Arbitration Docket, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 6 (2014) (“[T]he Court is
not in the business of error correction. Rather, the Court seeks to decide legal
issues of broad public importance.” (footnote omitted)); SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A
petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists
of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of
law.”).
106. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003) (“Finality attaches
when [the Supreme] Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or
denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari
petition expires.”).
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correct errors exist through the collateral review process. This
process, long-maligned as a series of endless appeals, has been
curtailed in recent decades as American law sought to
re-emphasize the finality of criminal judgments. 107
As the defendant—now serving his sentence and thereafter
generally referred to as the “prisoner” (or “petitioner” or
“movant,” depending the procedural context)—seeks another
journey up the ladder of review, each additional step constricts
the extent to which the substance of his arguments are at issue.
The question of his guilt becomes more and more subordinate to
questions regarding his compliance with various procedural
hurdles and deadlines and with issues regarding the extent to
which his arguments are cognizable at all. Each successive court
starts with the prisoner’s guilt as an established proposition and
has to be convinced that it is even its business to re-examine the
process that made that determination.
A prisoner convicted in federal court can ask the federal trial
court to vacate his conviction and sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, on the grounds that the judgment was imposed “in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 108 A
prisoner convicted in state court can bring a similar action in
federal
court,
after
first
exhausting
his
available
post-direct-appeal review remedies in state court. 109 These
proceedings—collateral to the prisoner’s original trial and
appeal—though generally defined by statute in modern practice,
arose out of the Common Law writ of habeas corpus and still can
be referred to as habeas petitions. 110
107. See generally Scott R. Grubman, What a Relief? The Availability of
Habeas Relief Under the Savings Clause of Section 2255 of the AEDPA, 64 S.C.
L. REV. 369 (2012) (providing additional history and background on the common
law writ of habeas corpus and AEDPA’s modern adaptation of its substantive
and procedural application); Randal S. Jeffrey, Successive Habeas Corpus
Petitions and Section 2255 Motions After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996: Emerging Procedural and Substantive Issues, 84 MARQ. L.
REV. 43 (2000) (same).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). See also United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031,
1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining the purpose and function of 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2012) (addressing federal collateral review
remedies for State prisoners).
110. The Talmudic conundrum regarding the extent to which a § 2255
proceeding is “not a habeas corpus proceeding,” while providing a remedy
“exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas
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Such a petition “may not be used as a chance at a second
appeal.” 111 “Because collateral review is not a substitute for a
direct appeal . . . a defendant must assert all available claims on
direct appeal,” and “relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for
transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow
compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct
appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of
justice.” 112
A state 113 and a federal prisoner 114 each face a one-year
period of limitation in which to bring his habeas claim in federal
court, running from the latest of: the date his judgment becomes
final on direct appeal; the date on which any impediment to his
filing his claims created by government action “in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed”; 115 “the
date on which the [constitutional] right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review”; 116 or “the date on which
the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 117
A federal habeas court will not grant relief to prisoners
convicted in state court for “any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of
the claim”:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined,” is beyond
the scope of this Article. Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1059–60 (11th
Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 220 (1952), and Hill
v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962)).
111. Berry, 624 F.3d at 1038 (citation omitted).
112. Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations
omitted).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012).
114. Id. § 2255(f) (2012).
115. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(B); id. § 2255(f)(2).
116. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(C); id. § 2255(f)(3).
117. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (2012); id. § 2255(f)(4).
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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding. 118

This additional layer of review in federal court, thus, does not
grant a federal judge discretion to decide for himself whether he
thinks the prisoner’s previously-raised claims are meritorious. If
anything, a federal court owes additional deference to the state
courts’ handling of the convicted defendant’s claims. “[O]n habeas
review, ‘a federal court may not overturn a state court decision
rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because
the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court
instead may do so only if the state court decision was objectively
unreasonable.’” 119 Factual determinations made by the state
court while considering the prisoner’s state collateral review
petition are presumed by the federal court to be correct and the
prisoner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 120
Federal courts are not only limited in their ability to
reconsider claims state prisoners already presented to the state
courts; they are also limited in their ability to consider claims
state prisoners are trying to raise for the first time in federal
court. If a state prisoner “failed to develop the factual basis of a
claim in state court proceedings,” the federal habeas court will
only hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim under certain
circumstances. First, the claim must rely on a “new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” or on “a
factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered
through the exercise of due diligence,” and, second, “the facts
underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no

118. Id. § 2254(d).
119. Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (citation omitted). See
also Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (“A state-court decision is
contrary to this Court’s clearly established precedents if it applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it confronts a set of
facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court but
reaches a different result.”).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2012).
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reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense.” 121
If a prisoner wants to file a second or successive habeas
petition, our system avoids re-examining old decisions once made
and even resists considering newly-thought-of arguments that
could have been raised earlier. A state 122 or federal 123 prisoner
cannot reargue any issues he raised unsuccessfully in an earlier
petition. Nor can he raise any new issue he failed to raise earlier
unless he can show that:
(A) the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,
that was previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence;
and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 124

In order even to file such a new claim in federal court, the
petitioner must first “move in the appropriate court of appeals for
an order authorizing the district court to consider the
application.” 125 If the appellate court refuses to authorize the
filing of a second or successive petition, that order “shall not be
appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing
or for a writ of certiorari.” 126
If a prisoner does manage to get his habeas claims heard by
the federal trial court, and that court denies his petition, he can
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2012).
122. See id. § 2244(b)(1) (“A claim presented in a second or successive
habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior
application shall be dismissed.”).
123. See id. § 2255(h) (requiring a second or successive motion by a federal
prisoner to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence to be certified by a panel to
contain new evidence or a new rule of constitutional law not previously
available); id. § 2244(a) (cross-referencing § 2255).
124. Id. § 2244(b)(2).
125. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
126. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(E).

1270

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243 (2016)

only obtain review by the federal appellate court if either the trial
judge or the appellate court grants him a certificate of
appealability. 127 Such a certificate is only warranted if the
petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 128
A prisoner asserting his innocence will find that each step up
the ladder of review, or return trip up the ladder, comes with
additional reliance on the results of decisions made previously. In
holding that a prisoner, generally, has no right to appointed
counsel to help him navigate the collateral review process, the
Supreme Court “contrasted the trial stage of a criminal
proceeding, where the State by presenting witnesses and arguing
to a jury attempts to strip from the defendant the presumption of
innocence,” from later proceedings “where the defendant needs an
attorney not as a shield to protect him against being ‘haled into
court’ by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence,
but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt.” 129
The Supreme Court explained that “[p]ostconviction relief is even
further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary
direct review” and “serve[s] a different and more limited purpose
than either the trial or appeal.” 130
AEDPA added weight to finality in the courts’ balancing act
with accuracy. A prisoner seeking a return trip to the courthouse
to have his actual guilt or innocence re-examined has a difficult
road to travel. 131
127. Id. § 2253(c).
128. Id. § 2253(c)(2).
129. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quotations omitted). Of
course, as with many collateral review issues, the right to an appointed attorney
within this process is somewhat complicated. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct.
1309, 1320 (2012) (holding that “a procedural default will not bar a federal
habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if,
in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in
that proceeding was ineffective”); see also Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911,
1921 (2013) (extending Martinez’s holding to cases “where . . . [a] state
procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly
unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to
raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal”).
130. Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 8, 10 (citation omitted).
131. See Grubman, supra note 107, at 378–81 (discussing “AEDPA’s
Restrictions on Second or Successive Motions for Post-Conviction Relief”). See
generally, Jeffrey, supra note 107 (discussing AEDPA’s “dramatic[] change[s]” to
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B. The Talmud’s Open-Ended Post-Conviction Review Process
Like America’s criminal justice system, the Talmud requires
various procedural safeguards to protect the rights of the
accused. Though the Talmud imposes a death penalty for a
variety of offenses, “[t]he rabbinic legal system is. . . so extreme in
protecting both the innocent and the guilty” that the “barriers to
imposition of the death penalty by the rabbinic courts amount to
a supercharged Bill of Rights.” 132 A common retort to the
Talmud’s repeated endorsement of the death penalty and
exhaustive discussion of the proper (and to the modern mind,
horrific) means of carrying it out is the expression that any court
that managed to overcome the numerous hurdles to actually
imposing a death sentence even once in seven years “was known
as ‘the killing court.’” 133

“both the procedural and substantive law governing second and successive
applications” for collateral relief). As Jeffrey recognizes, “[o]ne focus of the
AEDPA was to restrict habeas corpus relief available in the federal courts.” Id.
at 44.
132. See Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1177, 1191–92
(discussing the Talmud’s barriers to carrying out the death penalty and the four
methods of execution utilized on those occasions when it is carried out).
133. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 206. The Talmud itself describes such a
court as a “destroyer.” Makkot 7a. Preeminent rabbis Tarfon and Akiva went so
far as to assert that “[h]ad we been on a sanhedrin [at the time when they still
convened and imposed death sentences,] no person would ever have been
executed.” Makkot 7a. Lest the reader think the rabbis were in agreement on
the criminal justice implications of a system of harsh capital punishments with
lax practical enforcement, Rabban Simeon ben Gamaliel replied to Tarfon and
Akiva that their policy “would thus increase shedders of blood in Israel.” THE
BOOK OF LEGENDS (SEFER HA-AGGADAH): LEGENDS FROM THE TALMUD AND
MIDRASH 744 (Hayim Nahman Bialik & Yehoshua Hana Ravnitzky eds.,
William G. Raude trans., Schoken Books 1992). Some resolve this dilemma by
deeming the entire capital criminal procedure set forth in the Talmud to be
“merely idealistic and pedagogical, . . . never actually implemented or intended
to be implemented.” Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1175. For
additional discussion about the debate between Rabbis Akiva and Tarfon and
Rabban Simeon ben Gamaliel, see Levine, supra note 70, at 1046–48.
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1. Trial Protections in the Talmud

A special court of twenty-three judges, referred to as the
Sanhedrei Katana, tried capital offenses. 134 A guilty verdict
required a majority vote by at least a three-judge margin (i.e., at
least thirteen to ten), and while “[a] judge who expressed an
opinion in favor of the defendant was forbidden to change his
views,” a change of mind in favor of the defendant was
permitted. 135
Guilty verdicts required testimony from at least two adult
eye-witnesses to the offense, who themselves had never been
accused of a criminal offense of any kind and who were not
related to the parties, judges, or each other. 136 Not only could a
defendant not be required to incriminate himself, he was not
permitted to do so, and any such evidence was inadmissible. 137
Witnesses could only testify to what they personally observed—
hearsay evidence was not permitted. 138 “Such eyewitness
testimony [was] the only valid method of proof”—no
circumstantial evidence was permitted—and any discrepancies in
the witnesses’ testimony, “even as to relatively minor matters,”
would cause the court to exclude their testimony. 139 In order for
an accused defendant to be condemned to death, the evidence
must show that he acted with specific intent to commit a capital
134. See STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 203 (explaining that the twenty-three
judge court was known as the “Small Sanhedrin,” in contrast to the “Great
Sanhedrin” (Sanhedrei Gadol), a seventy-one judge body authorized to try cases
involving false prophets, sages who instructed people to act in violation of the
law, and other grave offenses).
135. Id. at 206. But see Sanhedrin 34a1 (describing a rabbinic debate over
whether the rule prohibiting a judge from changing his mind in favor of
conviction applies only during initial deliberations during which judges are
encouraged to maintain their arguments, but would allow him to change his
mind at the vote on the verdict). Additional commentary on this debate can be
found in Sanhedrin 34a1 Schottenstein Edition nn.5–7.
136. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 204; see also Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy,
supra note 31, at 1179 (characterizing the evidentiary and procedural
safeguards, including the two-witness rule, as “breathtaking”).
137. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 205.
138. Id. at 206.
139. See Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1179 (explaining how
the judges would interrogate witnesses on tangential matters, like the thickness
of a fig tree’s branches at the site of a crime).
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offense. 140 Such proof required testimony that he was specifically
warned immediately before committing the act that it was
forbidden by law and punishable by death and that he
acknowledged those facts and carried out the action anyway. 141
2. Appellate Review in the Talmud
Talmudic courts were not hierarchically-structured, and thus
challenges seeking review of a verdict were raised before the
same court and judges that issued the original decision. 142 Like
the American system, 143 the Talmud provided that capital cases
“may be reversed in favor of acquittal . . . but they are not
reversed in favor of conviction.” 144 Interestingly, though it
presents the matter as at least open to question, the Talmud
seems to permit reversals of judgments of acquittal in at least
certain non-capital cases. 145
Executions were to take place immediately after a verdict
was reached, but the Mishnah states:

140. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 206.
141. Id.; see also Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1179 (noting
that two competent witnesses testifying that, in their view, the accused
proceeded to commit the capital offense after he was warned of the consequences
“is the only valid method of proof”).
142. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 202.
143. Under American law, the prosecution may appeal from a trial judge’s
post-verdict judgment of acquittal setting aside a jury’s guilty verdict, but it
may not seek to overturn a jury’s verdict in favor of acquittal without running
afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V (providing that no person shall be “twice put in jeopardy”); United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568–76 (1977) (concluding that
double jeopardy bars prosecutorial appeals from Rule 29(c) judgments of
acquittal); United States v. Ogles, 440 F.3d 1095, 1099–1101 (9th Cir. 2006)
(applying the double jeopardy rule to a court-directed acquittal upon the close of
the prosecution’s case); United States v. Moran, 312 F.3d 480, 487 n.7 (1st Cir.
2002) (finding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar appeal because the
judgment of acquittal came after a guilty verdict by the jury).
144. Sanhedrin 33b1.
145. See Sanhedrin 33b2–33b3 (relating the debates regarding whether death
penalty acquittals may be reconsidered in cases where lesser punishments
might still be imposed or whether the general rule even applies in all capital
cases).

1274

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243 (2016)

While the condemned is being escorted to the execution
grounds, one man stands at the courthouse door with flags in
his hand, and another sits astride a horse at a distance from
him, but still within sight. If someone says: I have grounds to
argue for his acquittal, [the flagman] waves the flags as a
signal, and the horse with its rider races to the execution party
and halts them. And even if [the condemned] himself says, “I
have grounds to argue for my own acquittal,” they return him
to the courthouse to consider his arguments. 146

Thus, even the condemned is entitled to seek re-argument of his
case “again and again,” as many times as he requests, so long as
there is “substance” in his argument. 147 Though the Mishnah
states that the condemned is returned to the courthouse “even
four or five times,” this phrase is understood to be used
figuratively and “there is actually no limit to the number of times
he may be brought back for reconsideration of his case,” as long
as he satisfies the “substance” requirement. 148
A member of the court could always call for the condemned to
be returned for further consideration of his case. 149 When capital
cases were tried, rabbinic disciples would observe the
proceedings, “and if one of them wished to advance an argument
in favor of acquittal,” he could do so, and “[i]f his words were
found to be of substance, he was elevated to the position of one of
the judges, and was given full voting rights.” 150
The requirement that the condemned raise an argument with
meaningful substance to it only applied to his third, fourth, or
subsequent challenges. Thus, beginning on the third time the
condemned leaves the courthouse on his way to his execution, “a

146. Sanhedrin 42b.
147. Sanhedrin 42b–43a (discussing the Mishnah’s statement that the
accused “is returned again and again . . . as long as there is substance to his
words”); Sanhedrin 42b Schottenstein Edition n.9 (noting Rashi’s holding that
“[i]f he presents an argument that seems to have some validity, he is returned to
the court for the consideration of his argument”).
148. Sanhedrin 42b Schottenstein Edition n.8.
149. See Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1186–87 (explaining
further that “the law requires that there be a sufficient distance for the
defendant to travel while court officials ride with him, shouting out his name,
his crime, and the names of the prosecuting witnesses, and asking anyone who
has exculpatory information to come forward”).
150. Sanhedrin 43a Schottenstein Edition n.22.
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pair of Torah scholars . . . accompany him,” to determine whether
there is substance to his challenge or not. 151
The first two times he is returned even if his argument
appears baseless, for it is possible that he indeed has a valid
argument but is unable to properly express it due to his fright.
When he returns to the courthouse, his mind will become more
settled and he will be able to present his case more
coherently. 152

Unlike the American legal system, a condemned prisoner’s
ability to return for further review of his case does not diminish
with every step he takes away from the courtroom. Under the
Talmud’s criminal justice system, there is no deference paid to
the tribunal’s earlier rulings in favor of the condemned’s guilt,
there is no penalty for failing to raise a claim at a previous
opportunity, and there are no procedural hurdles to overcome
before a claim can be heard on its merits. “Jewish law encourages
the reopening of cases to assure consideration of all nonfrivolous
arguments.” 153 A case only becomes “final” when the death
sentence is carried out.
C. American Law’s Partial Gateway Back to the Courthouse
While the American legal system may impose significant
procedural and substantive barriers to returning to the
courthouse, as it were, it at least recognizes the conundrum posed
by a claim of actual innocence by a condemned prisoner. This
scenario cannot be taken lightly, as the many condemned
prisoners released from death row demonstrate. 154 Yet, under the
151. Sanhedrin 43a.
152. Sanhedrin 43a Schottenstein Edition n.32.
153. Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1190–91.
154. See Douglas A. Blackmon, DNA Evidence Exonerates Louisiana Deathrow Inmate, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2012, at A03 (“With Thibodeaux’s release
Friday, he became the 300th wrongly convicted person and 18th death-row
inmate exonerated in the United States substantially on the basis of DNA
evidence, according to the New York-based Innocence Project, which provides
legal counsel to prisoners it believes can be exonerated through DNA testing.”);
Adam Liptak, Study of Wrongful Convictions Raises Questions Beyond DNA,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at A1 (reporting on the case of Jerry Miller, who
became the 200th American prisoner released by DNA evidence under the
Innocence Project, and the fourteenth on death row).
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American legal system, even having the opportunity to try to
establish one’s innocence in court, after one has been found guilty
and has exhausted all of the available avenues of direct and
collateral review, is not a road much traveled.
In a pre-AEDPA case, Leonel Torres Herrera was convicted
in Texas state court of capital murder and sentenced to death. 155
He then unsuccessfully challenged his conviction in both direct
appellate proceedings and state and federal collateral review
proceedings. 156 Ten years after his conviction, he filed a second
federal habeas petition, arguing that he was “actually innocent”
of the murder and that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
“cruel and unusual punishment[]” 157 and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of “due process of law” 158 therefore
precluded his execution. 159 Herrera proffered new evidence that
someone else had committed the crime. 160 After the federal trial
court considering his new habeas petition dismissed an additional
claim alleging a constitutional violation during Herrera’s
prosecution, it stayed his execution to consider his new
evidence. 161 The federal appellate court vacated the stay, citing
then-existing precedent “that claims of newly discovered
evidence, casting doubt on the petitioner’s guilt, are not
cognizable in federal habeas corpus.” 162 Only new evidence that
“bear[s] upon the constitutionality of the applicant’s detention,”
such as a constitutional violation in his original trial, could
justify federal habeas relief; a federal court could not consider

155. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993) (recounting the trial
and conviction of Herrera for the murder of a police officer in January 1982,
after which Herrera also pled guilty in July 1982 to the murder of a public
safety officer).
156. Id.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
159. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 393 (summarizing petitioner’s claims).
160. See id. at 393, 396–97 (offering multiple affidavits that Herrera’s
brother, who died in 1984, committed the crimes).
161. See id. at 397 (noting the previous rejection of Herrera’s separate
Constitutional claims for lack of evidentiary basis).
162. Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)).

THE SUPREME COURT’S TALMUDIC DEBATE

1277

evidence that was “merely . . . relevant to the guilt of a state
prisoner.” 163
Reviewing the federal appellate court’s ruling, the United
States Supreme Court reaffirmed “that federal habeas courts sit
to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the
Constitution—not to correct errors of fact.” 164 The Supreme Court
noted that a person charged with a crime “is entitled to a
presumption of innocence,” but Herrera was not. 165 “[I]n the eyes
of the law, petitioner does not come before the Court as one who
is ‘innocent,’ but, on the contrary, as one who has been convicted
by due process of law of two brutal murders.” 166 Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted the various constitutional safeguards “ensuring
against the risk of convicting an innocent person,” but, echoing
Chief Justice Burger’s acknowledgement that a defendant is
entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one, he reiterated that
“due process does not require that every conceivable step be
taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting
an innocent person.” 167 Rehnquist explained: “To conclude
otherwise would all but paralyze our system for enforcement of
the criminal law.” 168
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court acknowledged that federal
habeas law does not “cast[] a blind eye toward innocence” and
that “a proper showing of actual innocence” could serve as “a
gateway through which a habeas petitioner [could] pass to have
his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the
merits.” 169 Herrera had no separate constitutional claim to save,
so his bare innocence claim was not cognizable. 170

163. Id.
164. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
165. Id. at 399–400.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 398–99. See U.S. v. Lutwak, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953) (“A
defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.”).
168. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 399.
169. Id. at 404.
170. Id. at 404–05 (holding that the gateway exception was “inapplicable
here,” because Herrera did “not seek excusal of a procedural error so that he
may bring an independent constitutional claim challenging his conviction or
sentence”).
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Subsequently, in Schlup v. Delo, 171 the Supreme Court
addressed the case of a prisoner not bringing a bare innocence
claim, like Herrera, but one attempting to use his innocence
claim as a gateway to allow consideration of his otherwise
procedurally-barred substantive constitutional claims. 172 It is
important, here, to recognize the difference between the type of
relief Schlup was seeking and the type of relief Herrera had
sought. Someone bringing a bare innocence claim, like Herrera,
seeks a court finding that he is actually innocent, while someone
bringing a gateway claim, like Schlup, seeks a court finding that
his showing of innocence is strong enough to overcome the
otherwise-applicable bars to consideration of his substantive
claims of constitutional violations at his original trial. 173
The Supreme Court recognized that, “importantly, a court’s
assumptions about the validity of the proceedings that resulted in
conviction are fundamentally different in Schlup’s case than in
Herrera’s.” 174 A prisoner’s bare innocence claim is “evaluated on
the assumption that the trial that resulted in his conviction had
been error free,” while a prisoner’s gateway innocence claim is
accompanied by claims that his trial was tainted by
constitutional violations. 175 Thus, while a bare innocence
claimant would have to show “evidence of innocence . . . strong
enough to make his execution ‘constitutionally intolerable’ even if
his conviction was the product of a fair trial,” 176 a gateway
innocence claimant only had to show “evidence of innocence so
strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the
trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of
nonharmless constitutional error.” 177 Because a bare innocence
171. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
172. See id. at 314 (observing that Schlup was seeking to overcome
“procedural obstacles” barring the federal courts from “address[ing] the merits
of [his separate] constitutional claims”).
173. Schlup was seeking a hearing on his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights and prosecutorial
withholding of exculpatory evidence in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process. Id. at 314.
174. Id. at 315.
175. Id. at 315–16.
176. Id. at 316.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
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claimant concedes that his trial was fair—he merely asserts that
new evidence exists casting doubt on its result—the courts
require a higher threshold before re-examining the guilty verdict
reached at his admittedly-fair trial. But because a gateway
innocence claimant is also casting doubt on the fairness of the
trial that produced his original guilty verdict, his evidence “must
[only] establish sufficient doubt about his guilt to justify the
conclusion that his execution would be a miscarriage of justice
unless his conviction was the product of a fair trial.” 178
The Supreme Court held that a prisoner asserting a gateway
innocence claim “must show that it is more likely than not that
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new
evidence.” 179 Unlike the applicable standard of review for
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in a prisoner’s direct
appeal, because the courts will necessarily be considering
evidence that was never presented to a jury, “the inquiry requires
the federal court to assess how reasonable jurors would react to
the overall, newly supplemented record,” and this “may include
consideration of the credibility of the witnesses presented at
trial.” 180
The Supreme Court emphasized that the threshold for
establishing a gateway innocence claim is intended to be high and
should only be met in a case that “is truly extraordinary.” 181 By
comparison, while recognizing that a bare innocence claim is
hypothetically possible, the Supreme Court has yet to ever find a
case compelling enough to meet that even higher threshold. 182
Displaying a Talmudic approach to discerning the unresolved
threshold for as-yet hypothetical bare innocence claims, the
Supreme Court reasoned: “The sequence of the Court’s decisions
in Herrera and Schlup—first leaving unresolved the status of
freestanding claims and then establishing the gateway
178. Id.
179. Id. at 327.
180. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538–39 (2006).
181. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (citations omitted).
182. See House, 547 U.S. at 555 (“We conclude here, much as in Herrera,
that whatever burden a hypothetical freestanding innocence claim would
require, this petitioner has not satisfied it.”); see also McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133
S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) (“We have not resolved whether a prisoner may be
entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.”).
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standard—implies at the least that Herrera requires more
convincing proof of innocence than Schlup.” 183
The American legal system recognizes the need to balance
the accuracy of its results with the finality of its decisions.
Defendants are accorded significant constitutional protections
before they can be deemed guilty in the first instance. 184 Even
after they are adjudged guilty, prisoners have the ability to
challenge their convictions through the direct appeal process and
even thereafter through collateral review. 185 Every step further
away from the trial courthouse, however, comes with a narrowing
of the defendant’s ability to have the question of his guilt reexamined. His presumption of innocence disappears the moment
the trial jury finds him guilty. The judges who consider first his
post-verdict motions, then his appeal, and ultimately his habeas
petitions will grant increasing amounts of deference to the
decisions that preceded their review of a case. This is not because
the courts are blind to the possibility that an innocent man may
be approaching execution. The courts’ difficulty comes in the fact
that a person who has exhausted his direct and collateral review
mechanisms appears in court as a guilty man, not as an innocent
man. Claims once heard, may not be heard again. Claims that are
procedurally-barred may never be heard at all. To the frustrated
prisoner, there may be none so deaf as those that will not hear. 186

183. House, 547 U.S. at 555.
184. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing fair trial provisions under American
law).
185. See supra Part III.A.2–3 (reviewing the procedures of direct and
collateral review under American law).
186. See THE HOME BOOK OF PROVERBS, MAXIMS AND FAMILIAR PHRASES
(Burton Stevenson ed., 1948) (“[W]ho is so deaf as he that will not hear?”
(quoting JOHN HEYWOOD, PROVERBS, Pt. ii, ch. 9 (1546))); see also Jeremiah 5:21
(“Hear now this, O foolish people, and without understanding; which have eyes,
and see not; who have ears, and hear not.”).
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IV. The Thousand-Year Debate About Finality in Criminal Justice
A. Rav Acha Bar Huna Debates Rav Sheishess
The rabbis of the Talmud considered the question of finality,
too, and in true Talmudic fashion, they considered the case of a
dissenting judge who has something to say, but cannot speak.
The Mishnah provides that “[i]f someone says: I have
grounds to argue for [the condemned person’s] acquittal,” a man
on horseback “races to the execution party and halts them.” 187
Rashi states that this procedure applies if one of the judges has a
new argument to present that could alter the verdict, but
commentary suggests that the same rule applies if someone who
is not a judge has new evidence to present. 188
In the Gemara, Rav Acha bar Huna posed the question:
If one of the disciples said, ‘I have grounds to argue for [the
defendant’s] acquittal, but then, before he could advance his
argument, he was struck mute, and the judges were thus
prevented from hearing his line of reasoning, what is the law?
Do we simply disregard the fact that this disciple ever came
forward, or do we instead rule that the case must be retried
before a different panel of judges? 189

Commentary explains that a different panel of judges is
suggested, instead of having the original panel of judges rehear
the case, because whatever line of reasoning the mute disciple
wished to raise had already eluded the first set of judges. 190 A
new panel of judges, through their own, fresh analysis of the case,
might discover the mute disciple’s argument. 191
The Talmud states that Rav Sheishess “blew on his
hands,” 192 before responding:

187. Sanhedrin 42b.
188. Sanhedrin 42b Schottenstein Edition n.6.
189. Sanhedrin 43a.
190. See infra note 192–192 (detailing the Talmud’s response to the
hypothetical question of the man struck mute).
191. Sanhedrin 43a Schottenstein Edition n.23.
192. See id. at n.24 (blowing on his hands “was a show of scorn”). Rashi
explains: “Rav Sheishess was in effect saying: ‘Just as the wind created by my
own breath has no lasting value, so too, your inquiry is devoid of merit.’” Id.

1282

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243 (2016)

If you are prepared to dismiss the case simply because [this
disciple] was struck mute, then by the same token, you would
also have to dismiss any capital case ever tried; for perhaps
someone at the far end of the world might know of an
argument for acquittal of which the court is not aware! 193

Rav Sheishess’s opinion did not hold sway, however. The
Gemara explains that in Rav Sheishess’s hypothetical reference
to an argument possibly awaiting the court at the far end of the
world, “no one has actually come forward and said that he has
reason to believe the condemned man is innocent.” 194 Whereas in
Rav Acha bar Huna’s hypothetical case, the now-mute disciple (a
disciple who immediately dies or for whatever reason cannot
state his argument) “has come forward and said this; he has
merely not had a chance to present his line of reasoning.” 195
The Gemara noted the teaching of Rav Yose Bar Chanina
that “[i]f one of the disciples argued for acquittal and then died,
we view him as if he were still alive, maintaining his position for
acquittal.” 196 This could have implied that only if the disciple
actually makes his argument before dying is his stance in favor of
acquittal to be counted, “but when he never declares his
argument for acquittal—as, for instance, in our case where he is
struck mute—in such case, there is no significance to his words
whatsoever.” 197 The Gemara “rejects this inference,” presuming
that Rav Acha would respond:
If the disciple declared his argument for acquittal, it is obvious
to me that his words are to be reckoned with. The question you
should have is whether the proceedings are affected when he
said that he can argue for acquittal but died (or was struck
mute) before doing so. 198

As is often the case, the Gemara does not provide a definitive
answer. 199 The text leaves it unclear whether the example of “a
disciple who declared his argument for acquittal before being
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Sanhedrin 43a.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy, supra note 31, at 1188.
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incapacitated” was cited “because this is the only case in which
his words are still reckoned with” or whether this example was
cited “merely because it is the more common” case. 200 Rashi
suggests that if the latter view is correct, then Rav Yose “holds
that it is not crucial for the disciple to actually articulate his
argument; it is enough if he merely says that he knows of such an
argument.” 201
Conceding that “[i]t is certainly unusual that [the disciple]
should be incapacitated at precisely that moment” when he is
attempting to raise a new argument for the condemned person’s
acquittal, 202 the Talmud nonetheless considers the implications of
such a scenario. As commentary explains, “we must be concerned
that the disciple was about to make a substantive argument that
might have altered the verdict.” 203 Rashi holds: “If we are indeed
concerned for this possibility, we must dismiss the current
proceedings, and convene a new set of judges to retry the case.” 204
Rashi essentially asserted that a system that refuses to
execute an even-possibly innocent person cannot impose finality
in its decisions. The court could not reach a final determination of
guilt if additional arguments still existed somewhere.
B. Rabbi Scalia Debates Rabbi Stevens
More than one thousand years after Rav Acha bar Huna and
Rav Sheishess debated whether a condemned man should be
allowed another trip to the courthouse, based on a new—but
unstated—argument for acquittal, Justice John Paul Stevens and
Justice Antonin Scalia continued their debate, in the case of Troy
Davis. 205 Davis’s story began twenty years earlier.
A Georgia court convicted and sentenced Davis to death for
the 1989 murder of Savannah police officer Mark Allen
MacPhail. 206 In his direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Sanhedrin 43a Schottenstein Edition n.27 (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Rashi).
Sanhedrin 43a Schottenstein Edition n. 27.
Sanhedrin 43a n.23.
Id.
In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 (2009).
See Davis v. State, 426 S.E.2d 844, 845 (Ga. 1993) (affirming his
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affirmed Davis’s conviction and death sentence, and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. 207 In subsequent
collateral review proceedings, the Georgia trial court denied
Davis’s state habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court of
Georgia affirmed the denial of Davis’s petition, and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari review of the Supreme
Court of Georgia’s decision. 208
In Davis’s first federal habeas petition, he raised several
claims asserting violations of his constitutional rights in the
course of his original trial. 209 Because he had failed to raise these
claims in earlier proceedings, Davis asserted a gateway innocence
claim—arguing “that his constitutional claims of an unfair trial
must be considered, even though they are otherwise procedurally
defaulted, because he has made the requisite showing of actual
innocence under Schlup.” 210 Although Davis complained on
appeal that the federal trial court did not adequately address the
merits of his gateway innocence claim, he conceded that it
nonetheless went on to address and reject the merits of his
constitutional claims. 211 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit likewise failed to find error in the district
court’s conclusion “that Davis has not borne his burden to
establish a viable claim that his trial was constitutionally unfair,”
and it affirmed the denial of Davis’s habeas petition. 212
Davis subsequently presented new evidence to the state trial
court in an “extraordinary motion for new trial,” pursuant to
Georgia law. 213 The state trial court denied Davis’s motion after it
“exhaustively reviewed each submitted affidavit and considered
in great detail the relevant trial testimony, if any, corresponding
conviction and sentence).
207. Id., cert. denied, 510 U.S. 950 (1993).
208. Davis v. Turpin, 539 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 842
(2001).
209. Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2006).
210. Id. at 1251.
211. See id. at 1252–53 (“Davis recognizes that, notwithstanding the
procedural bar, the district court did consider the merits of his constitutional
claims and rejected them as a matter of law.”).
212. Id. at 1256.
213. In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 814 (2009) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41
(West)).

THE SUPREME COURT’S TALMUDIC DEBATE

1285

to each.” 214 Davis’s further attempts to seek relief from the
Georgia courts and State Board of Pardons and Paroles were
unsuccessful. 215 The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the
lower court’s denial of Davis’s motion, despite a “painstaking[]”
review of Davis’s proffered evidence, concluding that it “simply
cannot disregard the jury’s verdict in this case.” 216 Thereafter, the
Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles issued an unusual
statement, saying that “[a]fter an exhaustive review of all
available information regarding the Troy Davis case and after
considering all possible reasons for granting clemency, [it]
determined that clemency is not warranted.” 217 Ultimately, the
federal court of appeals rejected Davis’s application for
permission to file a second federal habeas petition, holding that
“Davis has completely failed to meet the procedural requirements
of § 2244(b)(2).” 218
While only the jury at Davis’s original trial expressly
addressed the question of whether Troy Davis was proven guilty
of the murder of Officer MacPhail beyond a reasonable doubt,
multiple state and federal courts determined that Davis’s trial
was fair and constitutional. 219 Davis still had various
opportunities to present his new evidence purporting to establish
his innocence, but the judges and state officials considering
Davis’s claims viewed his claims through their deference to “the
jury [that] had the benefit of hearing from witnesses and
investigators close to the time of the murder.” 220 By the time Troy
Davis’s case came back to the United States Supreme Court on
the question of whether he was entitled to a new evidentiary
hearing on the question of his guilt, the American judicial system
214. See id. (listing six categories of over twenty affidavits submitted by
Davis as newly discovered evidence).
215. See id. at 814–15 (discussing Davis’s various attempts to obtain relief
from the Georgia courts and State Board of Pardons and Paroles).
216. Id. at 815 (quoting Davis v. State, 283 Ga. 438, 447 (2008))
217. Id. at 816 (quoting Georgia’s State Board of Pardons and Paroles, State
of Georgia, Statement Regarding Troy Davis Case (Sept. 28, 2008)).
218. Davis, 565 F.3d at 816.
219. See supra notes 208–216 (tracing the procedural history of the Davis
case).
220. In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 815 (2009) (quoting the Georgia Supreme
Court’s decision in Davis, 660 S.E.2d at 362–63).
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had determined that he was guilty, that he had been accorded a
fair and constitutionally-valid trial and appellate process, and
that his new claims of innocence were unpersuasive.
Nevertheless, on Davis’s motion citing the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus, 221 the
Supreme Court ordered that Davis’s case be returned to a
Georgia federal courthouse, and remanded the matter to the trial
court to “receive testimony and make findings of fact as to
whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of
trial clearly establishes petitioner’s innocence.” 222
Justice Scalia, writing for himself and Justice Thomas,
argued that the Court was wasting everybody’s time. “Eighteen
years ago, after a trial untainted by constitutional defect, a
unanimous jury found petitioner Troy Anthony Davis guilty of
the murder of Mark Allen MacPhail.” 223 Now, here was the Court
instructing the district court to adjudicate Davis’s habeas petition
“even though every judicial and executive body that has
examined petitioner’s stale claim of innocence has been
unpersuaded.” 224
In his most controversial assertion, 225 Justice Scalia wrote
that the Supreme Court “has never held that the Constitution
forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full
and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he
is ‘actually’ innocent.” 226 Many of Justice Scalia’s critics
misconstrue this as a statement that the Constitution would
allow the execution of an innocent person. Those critics are
missing his point. Justice Scalia did not say the Constitution
allows the execution of a prisoner who is actually innocent.

221. Davis v. Terry, 625 F.3d 716, 718 (11th Cir. 2010).
222. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 (2009).
223. Id. at 954 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Vincent Rossmeier, Scalia: Innocence Doesn’t Matter, SALON
(Aug 18, 2009), http://www.salon.com/2009/08/18/scotus_5/ (last visited Sept. 21,
2016) (characterizing Justice Scalia’s dissent as possessing a “certain
callousness” about “whether the courts should care if the state puts an innocent
man to death”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
226. In re Davis, 557 U.S. at 955.
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The Torah may teach: “An innocent person you shall not
slay.” 227 Justice Scalia does not consider Davis to be an innocent
person. He considers Davis to be a convicted murderer. He is
guilty. It has been determined.
Justice Stevens, writing for himself, Justice Ginsburg, and
Justice Breyer, issued an opinion concurring with the Supreme
Court’s order, responding to the arguments raised in Justice
Scalia’s dissent from the Court’s action. 228 Justice Stevens scoffed
that Justice Scalia “assume[d] as a matter of fact that petitioner
Davis is guilty of the murder of Officer MacPhail.” 229 But Justice
Scalia did not assume Davis’s guilt. Justice Scalia took notice of
the trial court’s adjudication of Davis’s guilt and the fact that no
subsequent review of his trial in direct or collateral proceedings
found any constitutional defects in Davis’s trial. 230 Justice Scalia
took Davis’s guilt as an established fact because it had been
established at Davis’s trial.
The Justices also disagreed about whether the federal courts
would have the authority to offer Davis any relief. AEDPA bars
relief to a state prisoner whose claim had been adjudicated by the
state courts on the merits, unless the state adjudication “resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.” 231 Justice Stevens
argued that neither Congress nor the Constitution would
countenance an application of AEDPA’s procedural bars that
would allow the execution of a person with “even the most robust
showing of actual innocence” but precluded from relief due to
“minor procedural error.” 232
In a scene reminiscent of the Gemara, Rabbi Stevens posed
this Talmudic hypothetical:

227. Sanhedrin 33b1. See also Exodus 23:7 (“Keep thee far from a false
matter; and the innocent and righteous slay thou not: for I will not justify the
wicked.”).
228. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 952–54 (2009).
229. Id. at 952–53.
230. See id. at 954 (regarding the trial of Davis as “untainted by
constitutional defect”).
231. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
232. In re Davis, 557 U.S. at 953–54 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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[I]magine a petitioner in Davis’s situation who possesses new
evidence conclusively and definitively proving, beyond any
scintilla of doubt, that he is an innocent man. The dissent’s
reasoning would allow such a petitioner to be put to death
nonetheless. 233

One can almost picture Rabbi Scalia blowing on his hands in
scorn234 as he responded:
There is no sound basis for distinguishing an actual-innocence
claim from any other claim that is alleged to have produced a
wrongful conviction. If the District Court here can ignore
§ 2254(d)(1) on the theory that otherwise Davis’s actualinnocence claim would (unconstitutionally) go unaddressed,
the same possibility would exist for any claim going beyond
clearly established Federal law. 235

Justice Scalia characterized the Supreme Court’s action as
depending on the idea “that capital convictions obtained in full
compliance with law can never be final.” 236 He should have
quoted Rav Sheishess. Perhaps someone at the far end of the
world might know of an argument of which the trial and
reviewing courts were not aware.
The real difference of opinion between Justice Stevens and
Justice Scalia was not whether Troy Davis was innocent or guilty,
but what it means to be innocent or guilty. As the Talmud might
ask, what is the essence of innocence? The real debate between
the Justices was whether guilt is a decision made once, in a full
and fair trial, ensured by a thorough appellate process reviewing
the manner in which that decision was made, or whether guilt is
a question that remains unresolved until all possible innocence
claims are heard and disposed of, even claims residing at the far
end of the world. What are the Justices doing if not “asking about
[the] definition[] and essence[]” of guilt? 237

233. Id. at 954.
234. See supra note 192 (explaining the cultural significance of the physical
gesture).
235. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955–56 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation omitted).
236. Id. at 958.
237. Kirsch, What Happens When the Talmud Asks, ‘What If?’, supra note
10.
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The problem the Supreme Court wrestled with—and
continues to wrestle with 238—is how a criminal justice system
designed and operated by fallible human beings comes to a
definitive conclusion about a defendant’s guilt. If Justice Stevens
is correct that guilt is an objective state of being, then Troy
Davis’s claim must be heard. No court can come to a final,
objective decision resolving the question of Davis’s guilt. Someone
can always come up with a new argument, and Davis should be
returned to the courthouse to have the argument heard. If Justice
Scalia is correct that guilt is a legal a conclusion, then Davis has
already had his claim heard. The trial court determined that
Davis was guilty, and subsequent examinations of Davis’s trial in
his direct and collateral appeals have ensured that Davis’s trial
was fair and free of constitutional errors. 239 Justice Stevens
wanted the courts to ensure that an innocent man was not
executed. Justice Scalia believed the courts already had.
V. The Fate of Troy Davis
What do we know about Troy Davis’s guilt or innocence?
None of us—author or readers—have observed the witnesses or
heard the evidence presented to establish his guilt. It is not this
Article’s purpose to present that evidence, for it is not our
prerogative now to decide whether Troy Davis shot and killed
Officer MacPhail. What we know is that numerous courts
reviewed Davis’s original trial and determined that it was free of
constitutional defects. 240 As far as the American legal system is
concerned, Troy Davis was convicted by a jury of his peers in
accordance with due process of law. We must acknowledge,
238. See McQuiggin, in which Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito, continued to dissent from the
Supreme Court’s “actual innocence” exception to AEDPA’s procedural bars. 133
S. Ct. 1924, 1937 (2013).
239. See Davis v. State, 426 S.E.2d 844, 845–49 (Ga. 1993) (affirming
conviction of trial court and dismissing all claims of error alleged in appeal).
240. See Davis v. Turpin, 539 S.E.2d 129, 131 (Ga. 2000) (affirming denial of
state habeas petition), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 842 (2001); Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d
1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of federal habeas petition), cert.
denied, 551 U.S. 1145 (2007); Davis v. Terry, 625 F.3d 716, 717–18 (11th Cir.
2010) (summarizing subsequent procedural history of Davis’s case).
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however, that this does not attest to the metaphysical accuracy of
the result reached in those proceedings.
But Troy Davis received something more—something almost
no convicted defendant in America receives—an evidentiary
hearing to present new evidence challenging his guilt after he
had exhausted all usual avenues of appeal and collateral review.
While Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens debated the
philosophical meanings of guilt and finality, the Supreme Court
ordered Davis’s case transferred back to the federal trial court to
determine “whether evidence that could not have been obtained
at the time of trial clearly establishes [Davis’s] innocence.” 241 The
flag was waved and Davis was turned around to go back before
the tribunal to reconsider the question of his guilt.
The district court heard Davis’s new evidentiary claims and
rejected his actual innocence argument. 242 The district court
began its seventy-page decision with a twelve-page review of the
evidence marshalled in the original investigation, 243 a five-page
review of Davis’s probable cause hearing, 244 a seventeen-page
review of the evidence presented at Davis’s trial, 245 and a twopage review of Davis’s motions for post-trial relief. 246 Then, after
reviewing the evidentiary standards for establishing a claim of
actual innocence, the district court reviewed for twelve pages the
subsequent evidence purportedly calling Davis’s guilt into doubt,
including witness recantations 247 and evidence proffered to
directly establish Davis’s innocence. 248
After hearing and considering Davis’s new evidence, the
district court concluded “that while executing an innocent person
would violate the United States Constitution, Mr. Davis has
failed to prove his innocence.” 249 To Davis’s argument that his
241. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 952 (2009).
242. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *61 (S.D. Ga. Aug.
24, 2010) (ruling that “a complete review of the record in this case does not
require the reversal of the jury’s judgment”).
243. Id. at *1–12.
244. Id. at *12–17.
245. Id. at *17–34.
246. Id. at *35–37.
247. Id. at *46–54.
248. Id. at *54–58.
249. Id. at *1.
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case “involves credible, consistent recantations by seven of the
nine state witnesses,” 250 the district court responded:
Two of the recanting witnesses neither directly state that they
lied at trial nor claim that their previous testimony was
coerced. . . . Two other recantations were impossible to believe,
with a host of intrinsic reasons why their author’s recantation
could not be trusted, and the recantations were contradicted
by credible, live testimony. . . . Two more recantations were
intentionally and suspiciously offered in affidavit form rather
than as live testimony, blocking any meaningful crossexamination by the state or credibility determination by this
Court. . . . Moreover, these affidavit recantations were
contradicted by credible, live testimony. 251

The district court did credit the recantation offered by one
witness. However, in light of the fact that it considered his
original trial testimony “patently false, as evidenced by its
several inconsistencies with the State’s version of the events on
the night in question,” the district court did not believe his
testimony was “important to the conviction,” thus “rendering his
recantation of limited value.” 252
As to the affirmative evidence purporting to bolster Davis’s
innocence claim, the district court stated that Davis had “vastly
overstate[d] the value of his evidence of innocence.” 253 The district
court found that a witness who identified a different shooter was
“not credible.” 254 It deemed an uncorroborated hearsay
confession, testified to by several witnesses, to be untrustworthy,
noting that even one of the witnesses who recounted the
confession doubted its truth. 255 The district court did not consider
the other proffered evidence to be exculpatory or relevant to
Davis’s conviction and considered much of it to be “too general to
provide anything more than smoke and mirrors.” 256
Given the procedural history of every adjudication that had
been made before, the district court noted that “[t]he burden was
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at *54.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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on Mr. Davis to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new
evidence.” 257 One need not engage in a Talmudic digression by
elaborating on the factual merits of the case for or against Troy
Davis. Suffice it to say that the district court tasked with
considering Davis’s new factual claims compared the original
evidence used to establish his guilt at trial with the new evidence
presented on Davis’s behalf and concluded that “Mr. Davis’s new
evidence does not change the balance of proof from trial.” 258 The
district court explained: “Ultimately, while Mr. Davis’s new
evidence casts some additional, minimal doubt on his conviction,
it is largely smoke and mirrors. The vast majority of the evidence
at trial remains intact, and the new evidence is largely not
credible or lacking in probative value.” 259 The district court
concluded: “[T]he evidence produced at the hearing on the merits
of Mr. Davis’s claim of actual innocence and a complete review of
the record . . . does not require the reversal of the jury’s judgment
that Troy Anthony Davis murdered City of Savannah Police
Officer Mark Allen MacPhail on August 19, 1989.” 260
The district court asserted: “If there is a principle more
firmly embedded in the fabric of the American legal system than
that which proscribes punishment of the innocent, it is unknown
to this Court.” 261 It claimed to find such a principle enshrined in
the United States Constitution, “including,” but presumably not
limited to, “the Eighth Amendment” and its prohibition of “cruel
and unusual punishments.” 262 The district court’s faith in the
purported principle against punishing the “innocent” can only be
understood within the American legal system’s reliance on
finality. The district court acknowledged that “Mr. Davis’s guilt
was proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt, but not to a
mathematical certainty.” 263 And yet, Troy Davis could be
257. Id.
258. Id. at *59–60.
259. Id. at *61.
260. Id.
261. Id. at *41.
262. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”).
263. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *45 n.44 (S.D. Ga.
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executed, because he was not innocent. He was guilty. It had been
determined.
A little over a year later, the New York Times reported:
“Proclaiming his innocence, Troy Davis was put to death by lethal
injection on [September 21, 2011], his life—and the hopes of
supporters worldwide—prolonged by several hours while the
Supreme Court reviewed but then declined to act on a petition
from his lawyers to stay the execution.” 264 As far as the American
courts were concerned, the matter was closed. No petition from
the far end of the world would be heard.
VI. Conclusion
The rabbis of the Talmud were inspired by a “fierce urge to
arrive at the absolute truth.” 265 Yet, they also recognized: “If You
seek to have a world, strict justice cannot be exercised; and if You
seek strict justice, there will be no world. . . . If You do not relent
a little, the world will not endure.” 266 Even divine justice is
imperfect, recognizing that “there are those who are swept away
without justice.” 267 While Jewish tradition holds that G-d’s
presence is found in a court’s judgment, this can be conceived of
in many ways. One can believe “that every judgment that is
decided by a legitimate judge is divine regardless of its content,”
or one can believe that “only true judgment” is divine and a
judgment’s divinity “depends on its content and on its
truthfulness.” 268
In the American legal system, appellate courts do not exist to
ensure certain discovery of the truth. Appellate courts exist to
Aug. 24, 2010).
264. Kim Severson & John Schwartz, Georgia Inmate Executed; Raised
Racial Issues in Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2011, at A1.
265. STEINSALTZ, supra note 30, at 205.
266. THE BOOK OF LEGENDS, supra note 133, at 35–36.
267. See Adam Kirsch, If Even the Angel of Death Makes Mistakes, Where is
There True Justice?, TABLET (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.tabletmag.com/jewishlife-and-religion/184273/daf-yomi-98 (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (“In Chagiga
4b, Rav Yosef quotes a verse from Proverbs, ‘But there are those who are swept
away without justice,’ and questions it: ‘Is there one who goes before his time?’”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
268. Shapira, supra note 13, at 327–28 (quotation marks omitted).
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ensure that we seek the truth through a fair trial. Accuracy is
balanced with finality, but this is not finality for its own sake. It
is not simply that we must bring litigation to an end; it is the
belief that accuracy is best achieved through a fair process, not by
repetition. We do not believe that a best two-out-of-three trial
system would be any more accurate than one fair trial ensured
through appellate review. If you ask me whether Troy Davis was
guilty, I would ask you why my answer would be any more
reliable than the trial judge who heard the new evidence. We can
recognize the moral necessity of holding open the courthouse
doors for an actual innocence claim, while understanding that
someone still has to make a decision as to whether the defendant
met his burden to establish his innocence claim.
Yet we must also acknowledge that metaphysical truth is
impossible
to
achieve
in
any
human-designed
and
human-managed system. This does not relieve the courts of their
responsibility to be part of the search for truth. Acceptance and
recognition of the fact that metaphysical certainty is not possible
should ensure that appellate judges stay mindful of their
responsibility to oversee the safeguards in the system through
which we strive towards the truth.
“Tzedek, tzedek tirdof.” 269 “Justice, justice shall you seek.”
Seek, not find. The American legal system seeks justice—a justice
that lies somewhere between accuracy and finality.

269.

Deuteronomy 16:20.

